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In recent years the subject of decision making on large transport infrastructure projects and 
related institutional issues have received much attention in the academic and professional 
literature, partly triggered by the book Megaprojects and Risk (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). This book 
shows that for large infrastructure projects cost overruns and demand shortfalls are very 
common, and that institutional factors play an important role in this being the case. Recent 
academic contributions include special issues in Environment and Planning B (2007) and 
Transportation Planning and Technology (2007) and the book ‘Decision-making on mega projects. Cost-
benefit analysis, planning and innovation ‘ (Priemus et al., 2008).  
Wednesday 12 November 2008 as part of the two days NGI/IEEE conference ‘infrastructure 
systems’ in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, a special session was organized, titled ‘Large Transport 
Infrastructure Projects: improving institutions and decision making’. The session aimed (1) to add to 
the literature by exploring what is behind the insights into cost overruns and demand shortfalls, 
in particular by focusing on theoretical insights and in-dept cases, and (2) to contribute to solving 
current problems and improve current practice with respect to decision making and institutions. 
We hope the papers help fill the research gaps in these areas. This special issue of the European 
Journal of Transport and Infrastructure Research (EJTIR) gives an overview of a selection of papers of 
that session.  
The paper by Cantarelli, Flyvbjerg, Molin, and Van Wee deepens the literature on explanations 
for cost overruns, and links such explanations to a range of theories. The authors distinguish 
between four categories of explanations: technical, economic, psychological, and political, and 
conclude that political explanations are seen as dominant in accounting for cost overruns. Next 
the paper explores which theories are useful to understand these four categories of explanations. 
Agency theory is considered the most interesting for understanding political explanations and an 
eclectic theory is also considered possible. Non-political explanations are so diverse in character, 
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that a range of different theories (including rational choice theory and prospect theory) is 
considered more appropriate to understand these explanations than one all-embracing theory. 
Priemus’ paper covers decision-making for mega projects. According to Priemus the well-
described problems of cost overruns and demand shortfalls are generated already in the initial 
stages of the decision-making process by the absence of an appropriate problem analysis, the lack 
of alternatives, ambiguities about scope, no programme of functional requirements, flawed 
process architecture and the dissemination of contested information. The paper provides an 
overview of the impact of market dynamics and political discontinuity (which are sometimes 
interrelated) on decision-making on mega-projects. It analyses these impacts and it attempts to 
determine ways in which project managers could deal with them. One of the conclusions is that 
the identification and allocation of risks among public and private players is a crucial variable. 
Lessons to prevent or reduce flaws learned from past experience include: strengthen the 
knowledge base of the project; stimulate learning processes during the decision-making process; 
adopt a risk analysis followed by an optimal allocation of risks among public and private players 
and, finally, organise ongoing monitoring by accountants. 
Siemiatycki builds upon the earlier work on optimism bias of Flyvbjerg and others by presenting 
a corporate performance benchmarking approach. His paper explores whether innovative 
mechanisms of collecting and publicly disseminating information about the performance of 
government contractors on past projects can contribute to improving the success rate of future 
initiatives. Based on theory on optimism bias and drawing on international examples from North 
America, Europe and Asia, he found that the production and dissemination of greater 
information through benchmarking does not on its own lead to reductions in the prevalence of 
optimism biases.  However, there is evidence that when combined with incentives built formally 
into government procurement processes that reward strong past performance, benchmarking can 
support improvements in the quality of project outputs. 
In addition to these more general papers, the following papers are mainly case-oriented. In a case 
study from China, Mu, De Jong and Ten Heuvelhof focus on the importance of Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPPs) for the management of large transport infrastructure projects,. They place 
this subject in the context of the tremendous growth in demand for mobility in emerging 
economies that has led to a gap between investment needs and available public funding, and 
emphasize the importance of strategic behaviour. They found evidence on various types of 
strategic behaviour in the management of expressways in China. In addition they reflect on 
possible cures, including penalties for collusion attempts proportional to the potential benefits of 
collusion and the option to insist on a broad range of bidders. Finally they reflect on the 
implications for Europe.   
The paper of Leijten, Koppenjan, Ten Heuvelhof, Veeneman, and Van der Voort is a case-based 
study on how to deal with competing project management values under uncertainty. They use 
the Dutch case of RandstadRail, a regional rail line in the highly urbanized Western part of the 
Netherlands. Due to the uncertainty involved in many complex infrastructure engineering 
projects, it is not always possible for managers to establish detailed terms of reference at the 
outset of project development. In addition, a conflict of interest existed in the case at hand 
between the project management and the client’s administrations. Using RandstadRail as an 
example, their paper shows the problems that may occur in such situations and how 
unmanageability arises. Lessons are derived with a view to developing better manageable 
practice. The authors warn against too strong a focus on transaction costs because this may 
threaten a sound balance between project management values. Another lesson is that non-
objectifiable values such as quality and safety are more difficult to defend in value trade-offs than 
objectifiable ones, such as time and costs. 
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Osland and Strand’s paper is on the politics and institutions of project approval and the 
importance of the theory of strategic misrepresentation for explaining miscalculations of costs 
and benefits in large infrastructure projects. The theory’s major explanation of cost overruns is 
that the registration and representation of data and the calculations of costs and benefits are 
made by planners in organisations that have economic interests in the results – see also the paper 
of Cantarelli et al. in this special issue. Although Osland and Strand think the theory is helpful in 
understanding behaviour of specific actors, they conclude it has several shortcomings both in 
theoretical and methodological terms. Methodologically, they conclude the research does not 
have the design necessary for validating the conclusion of ‘the survival of the unfittest’. 
Theoretically, the framework does not offer any variation on the institutional variable nor on 
variation in planners' (actors') motives and rationality. Hence, there is a need for a broader 
theoretical framework. Finally they sketch such a framework and apply it to Norwegian 
transport planning. The Norwegian research in this area does not support the thesis that project 
approval is a result of planners’ strategic actions. More often it is an outcome of institutions 
where politicians play a key role at all levels and stages of the planning process, often neglecting 
planners’ analyses and recommendations.  
Peters’ paper is a case study of the Berlin Tiergarten tunnel project (VZB) that consists of a joint 
planning approval procedure for one road and several rail tunnels (inter-city, metro rail and city 
subway). Her narrative case study traces the decision-making processes for this crucial post-
Berlin Wall mega-project. It is structured around two central propositions related to mega-project 
decision-making, the first proposition being that 'giga-project' decisions create political and 
financial path dependencies and early 'points of no return' that often push forward even those 
elements of the bundle which would not have been built on their own. The second proposition is 
that, once the desired new infrastructure mega-projects are completed, the project promoters 
have an obvious interest and even public obligation to ensure that these are utilized as much as 
possible – even at the expense of other viable (and perhaps even preferable) alternatives. The 
paper raises important questions regarding optimistic forecasts, cost overruns, the role of prestige 
in large infrastructure projects, and the limits of public review procedures. It provides particular 
insights into a complex case where multiple urban transport mega-projects were bundled 
together for joint approval and implementation. 
Finally, Salling and Banister present what they call the "CBA-DK decision support model for 
assessment of transport projects". Cost-benefit analysis is the state-of-the art methodology for ex 
ante project evaluations in many countries (Hayashi and Morisugi, 2000). The Danish model 
makes use of conventional cost-benefit analysis resulting in aggregated single point estimates. 
They then use quantitative risk analysis with Monte Carlo simulation to produce interval results. 
Two special concerns in this paper is, firstly, the treatment of feasibility risk assessment adopted 
for evaluation of transport infrastructure projects and, secondly, whether this can provide a more 
robust decision support model. The model builds upon earlier work of Flyvbjerg and others in 
the area of reference class forecasting and optimism bias. Salling and Banister conclude that a 
combination of conventional cost-benefit analysis and quantitative risk analysis examination can 
increase the decision-makers’ possibility of making informed decisions. Another conclusion is 
that the CBA-DK decision support model results in more informed decision support for decision-
makers and stakeholders in terms of accumulated descending graphs.  
We hope the papers will contribute to a better understanding of cost overruns and demand 
shortfalls of large transport infrastructure projects, and the management and decision making of 
these projects. We realize that many more challenges remain. For instance, we need to better 
understand (a) why some projects are successful and whether success can be replicated, (b) 
geographical and sector differences in the performance of projects, (c) how to de-risk projects, (d) 
to evaluate experiments with methodological improvements and institutional arrangements that 
aim to improve current practice, (e) to develop better methods for ex ante assessment of the pros 
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and cons of large infrastructure projects, and finally (f) to further deepen theoretical 
constributions for explanations of cost overruns and demand shortfalls. 
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